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38 I.  INTRODUCTION* 
Employment  in Europe  is  today at  the  same  level as it was  in  1970. 
As  a  result,  11,2%  of  the  labor  force  is unemployed  today compared  to only 
2%  in  1970.  These  are  very  gloomy  statistics.  Do  they  reflect  an 
inevitable new  economic  reality,  or can  employment  growth  be  restored? 
It is  our  opinion,  developed  in  this  report,  that  policy  measures 
can  and  should  be  taken  now  to  restore  employment  growth.  These  measures 
must  act on supply,  on structure, at least as much  as  on demand;  otherwise, 
gains  will  be  temporary  at  best  and  may  in  fact  worsen  structural 
problems.  Thus,  our call for  a  two-handed  approach. 
The  European  employment  problem  does  not  have  a  single  cause.  To 
get  a  sense of  where  it comes  from,  one  must  take  a  historical perspective 
and  go  back  at  least  to  the  1960's.  At  the  cost  of  some  over-
simplification,  history since  then  can  be  conveniently  divided  between  the 
1960's,  the  1970's and  the  1980's. 
Low  real  wages  and  high  productivity  growth  during  most  of  the 
1960's  combined  to deliver sustained profitabilty,  balanced  growth  and  full 
employment.  In  this  environment  of  sustained  growth,  labour  market 
rigidities  were  partly  offset  by  wage  drift  and  job  security  provisions 
could  be  offered  by  growing  firms at little cost.  Welfare  programmes  could 
be  developed  by  governments  without  compromising  budget  balance. 
The  adverse  supply  shocks  of  the  1970's,  together with  unwarranted 
wage  increases,  turned  this  virtuous  circle into  a  vicious  one.  Decreases 
in  productivity  growth  and  increases  in  the  price  of  imported  materials 
suddenly  did  require  a  slow  down  in  labour  costs  which  was  not  easily 
accepted  by  workers.  While,  in  this  environment  of  lower  growth,  job 
security provisions were  now  more  expensive  for  firms  to provide,  they were 
more  essential  for  workers  threatened  by  job  losses;  while  welfare 
programmes  were  more  difficult  for  governments  to  finance,  the  need  to  do 
something  for  the  unemployed  was  more  pressing.  Firms  - faced  with  higher 
*  The  authors  wish  to  thank  Bernard  Connolly  and  other  discussants  from 
DG  II of  the  Commission  for  their help and  comments. -2-
direct and  indirect  labour and  material costs, as well as with artificially 
low  real  interest  rates  turned  to  investment  and  labour-saving 
technological progress,  further worsening  the  employement  problem. 
The  last stage is  that  of  a  cyclical demand  shortfall in the early 
1980's.  It  is  itself  largely  a  consequence  of  the  supply  shocks  of  the 
1970's.  Attempts  by  governments  to  maintain  output,  and  to  maintain  or 
expand  transfer programmes  in the face  of  adverse  supply shocks  had  led,  by 
1980,  to  high  inflation  and  large  budget  deficits.  The  fight  against 
inflation  and  the  return  to  budget  balance  have  been,  in  most  European 
countries,  the  top  policy priorities  of  the  last  four  years.  While  they 
have  been  largely  successful  on  their  own  terms,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
they have  had  until now  further adverse effects on output  and  employment. 
There is, we  believe, broad agreement  on  the general story outlined 
above.  There is less  agreement  on  what  this  implies  for  the  future  course 
of policy.  This- is partly because  of  different  views  about  the priorities 
of  economic  policy,  and  partly  because  of  disagreements  over  the  relative 
importance  of  the  various  factors  and  over  the  effects  of  policy  on 
activity.  We  believe  that  we  can  usefully  contribute  to  the  debate  by 
reviewing  arguments  and  facts  before  stating  our  policy  recommendations. 
In this way  the  nature  of  disagreements may  be  made  clearer  and  the  policy 
debate may  be  better focused. 
We  start  our  report  by  reviewing  unemployment  and  employment 
facts.  We  then  turn to the role of supply and  demand  factors  in explaining 
the  current  employment  woes.  We  then  consider  policy  options  and  make 
policy recommendations. -3-
II.  EMPLOYMENT  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT  FACTS 
II.1 Employment 
The  size  of  the  European  employment  problem  is  eloquently 
documented  in  Table  1.  While  the  US  has  achieved  substantial  employment 
growth  since  1970,  European  employment  has  remained  constant  during  the 
same  period, first grinding  to a  halt  in the  70's  and  then  declining  since 
1980.  During  the  last  decade,  fifteen  and  a  half million additional  jobs 
have  been created in the  US  while  the  number  of European  jobs has  decreased 
by a  million and  a  half. 
Table  1 
The  growth of employment  and  of  the  population of working  age. 
(%  rate of change, at annual rate) 
1971-80  198Q-84 
Employment  Population  Employment  Population 
EC  0,2  0,6  -0,6  1,0 
us  2,0  1,8  0,8  1,5 
Source:  EC  annual  report,  November  1984 
What  matters  however  is  not  employment  growth  per  se,  but 
employment  growth  in  relation  to  the  growth  of  the  population  of  working 
age.  This  puts  the  European  experience  in  slightly  less  bad  a  light. 
Table  1  also  shows  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  population of working  age  to 
have  been  lower  in  Europe  than  in  the  US,  although  one  must  question  the 
degree  to  which  population  growth  is  unaffected  by  the  employment  outlook 
when  migrant  workers  represent  a  substantial  fraction  of  the  labor  force. 
Even  with  this  adjustment,  the  employment  performance  of  Europe  remains· 
much  worse  than that of  the  US.  The  difference  in  growth  rates during  the 
70's  is  of  1,8%  for  employment  compared  to only  1,2%  for  population.  For 
the  80's,  the difference is of  1,4%  compared  to  0,5%  for population. -4-
One  might  expect  this  difference  in  employment  growth  rates  to  be 
reflected in a  much  worse  European  output  performance.  Table  2  shows  this 
not  to  have  been  the  case, at least  for  the  70's.  European  and  US  growth 
rates have  been  nearly  identical;  consequently  the  rate of  growth  of  labor 
productivity has  been much  higher in Europe  than in the  US. 
Table  2 
Output  and  productivity growth 
(%  rate of change, at annual rate) 
EC 
us 
GDP 
2,9 
2,9 
1971-80 
GDP  per  worker 
2,8 
0,9 
GDP 
0,8 
2,0 
Source:  Commission  of  the EC,  Annual Economic  Report,  1984/85 
198Q-84 
GDP  per worker 
1,4 
1,2 
Labour  productivity is measured  in the  table as  the ratio of  GDP  to 
the  number  of  workers  employed.  If  we  measure it instead as  the  ratio of 
GDP  to the  number  of men  hours,  the  difference is even more  pronounced,  as 
Europe  has  experienced  a  large  decrease  in  the  number  of  hours  per  worker 
since  1970.  The  ex post  facts  presented  in Table  2  may  help  to  explain  the 
widespread  European  perception  that,  as  output  growth  is  given,  labour 
productivity  increases  only  lead  to  lower  employment.  Although  difficult 
to  reconcile  with  theory,  this  perception certainly fits  the  experience  of 
the  1970s. 
One  would  like  to  know  whether  Europe  has  been  just  blessed  with 
higher  labour  productivity growth,  or  instead,  whether  labour  productivity 
growth  reflects  an  effort  on  the  part  of  firms  to  decrease  the  role  of 
labour  in  production,  and  is  therefore  another  manifestation  of  the 
employment  problem.  This,  however,  requires  one  to  go  beyond  simple 
statistics,  as  one  must  first  have  a  model  of  how  firms  can  substitute 
other  factors  for  labour  and  must  then  estimate  it to  find  out  how  much 
substitution actually  took  place.  We  shall  examine  this  issue  in  detail (2) 
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later  (see  Section 111.2).  We  note  however  that the  European  Commission's 
Annual  Report  1984/85  performs  such  an  estimation  and  concludes  that 
approximately  one  third  of  the  productivity  growth  during  1973-81  can  be 
attributed to substitution away  from  labour in the  process  of production!. 
Another  widespread  perception is that  the  US  and  Europe  differ not 
only  in  the  number  but  also  in  the  type  of  jobs  which  have  been  created. 
The  first half  of  table  3  gives  the  rate of  growth of  employment  by sector 
for  the  EC  and  the  US  for  the  period  1973-81  and  shows  indeed  a  much 
stronger  US  performance  in  the  service  sector.  The  second  half  of  the 
table,  however,  reports  deviations  of  employment  growth  rates  in  each 
sector  from  aggregate  employment  growth  rates.  What  comes  out  then  is  a 
very similar picture for  Europe  and  the  us.  At  that  level of  aggregation, 
there is no  substantial difference between the relative sectoral employment 
performances  of  the  EC  and  the  US. 
Table  3 
Employment  growth  by sector,  1973-81 
EC 
us 
EC 
us 
Agriculture  Industry 
Rates  of growth  (annual 
-2,8  -1,6 
o,o  0,6 
Deviations  from  aggregate rate 
-2,7 
-1,9 
(annual rate) 
-1,5 
-1,3 
Services 
rate) 
1,2 
2,9 
of  growth 
1,3 
1,0 
Source:  Commission  of the  EC,  Annual  Economic  Report,  1984/85. 
11.2 Unemplqyment 
A higher  increase  in  the working  age  population  than  in employment 
must  by definition either  lead  to  a  decrease  in labour  force  participation 
or to higher unemployment,  or both.  Participation rates have  indeed fallen 
in Europe,  especially since  1980.  As  table  4  shows,  however,  this has  not 
prevented a  sharp  increase in the unemployment  rate. -6-
Table  4 
Unemployment  rates 
1961-70  1971-80  1970  1980  1984 
EC  2,1  4,2  2,0  6,1  11,0 
us  4,7  6,4  4,9  7,1  7,5 
Source:  Commission  of the EC,  Annual  Economic  Re~ort, 1984/85. 
Two  facts  strongly  come  out.  The  first  is  what  appears  like  a 
steady  trend  increase  in  the  unemployment  rate  since  1970.  The  second  is 
the  much  sharper  increase  in  unemployment  in  the  1980's;  of  the  total 
increase in the  unemployment  rate  since  1970,  more  than half  occured after 
1980. 
What  are  the  characteristics  of  this  unemployment?  The  next  two 
tables  show  that it has  less  to do  with  the  normal  process  of  reallocation 
across  sectors,  of workers  changing  jobs voluntarily or involuntarily,  than 
with  the  semi-permanent  exclusion  of  some  workers  from  the  labour  force. 
Table  5  gives  the  proportion of unemployment  accounted  for  by  the  long-term 
unemployed: 
Table  5 
Long  term unemployment,  as  a  % of  unemployment 
us  France  Germany  UK 
1979 
6  months  and  more  8,8  55,1  39,9  39,7 
12  months  and  more  4,2  30,3  19,9  24,7 
1983 
6  months  and  more  23,9  67,3  54,1  57,8 
12  months  and  more  13,3  42,6  28,5  36,2 
Source:  Table  H,  EmEloyment  Outlook,  OECD,  September  1984 -7-
Long-term  unemployment  is  a  large  and  increasing  portion  of 
unemployment  in  Europe.  The  proportions  are  much  higher  for  European 
countries  than  for  the  US;  this  is  true  even  in  1979,  when  overall 
unemployment  rates were  roughly equal in Europe  and  the us. 
Table  6  gives  numbers  for  youth  unemployment  (unemployment  among 
those  under  25).  These  also  show  a  higher  incidence  of  unemployment  among 
the  young,  and  an  increase  in  both  the  level  of  youth  unemployment  and 
its  share  of  total  unemployment  since  1979.  The  differences  with  the  US 
are less marked,  however,  than for  long  term unemployment,  for  example,  and 
there  are  marked  differences  across  countries;  the  German  experience  is 
particularly noteworthy in this regard. 
Table  6 
Youth  unemployment  rate 
us  France  Germany  UK  Italy 
1979  11,3  13,3  3,4  10,6  25,6 
1984  13,0  24,7  10,5  23,7  33,7 
Source:  Table ·17,  Emflol!!!ent  Outlook,  OECD,  September  1984 
No  employment  growth,  high  and  increasing  unemployment  and  the 
emergence  of  a  class  of  permanently  unemployed.  This  is  the  European 
employment  picture over  the  last  15  years,  with  a  sharp  turn for  the worse 
in the last five years. 
III.  WHY  IS  EMPLOYMENT  SO  LOW  ? 
The  historical  overview  presented  in  the  introduction  makes  it 
clear  that  high  materials  prices,  labour  costs,  capital  deepening,  labour 
market  rigidities and  deficient demand  all share some  responsbility for  the 
current  employment  woes.  The  difficult  set  of  questions  has  to  do  with -8-
their respective  contributions.  In  this section,  we  review what  we  do  and 
do  not  know  about  the  role  of  these  factors  in  explaining  the  current 
employement  situation. 
Figure  1  provides  a  useful  guide  to  our  investigation.  The 
schedule  CC  shows  the  combinations  of output  and  real wages  consistent with 
the existing technology,  the existing capital stock and  profit maximisation 
by  firms.  NN  gives  the  full  employment  level  of  output,  so  that  point  E 
gives  the  level  of  real  wages  consistent  with  full  employment.  Points  to 
the  left  of  CC  correspond  to  deficient  demand.  Were  the  economy  at  point 
B,  for  example,  demand  reflation  would  be  sufficient  to  go  back  to  full 
employment.  Were  the  economy  at  poi•lt  A instead,  real wage  cuts or higher 
capital would  also  be  needed  to return to full employment. 
Figure  1  only  gives  a  picture  of  the  econo~y at  a  point  in  time. 
Over  time,  capital accumulation may  shift  the  CC  locus.  Take  for  example 
point  E,  where  there  is  full  employment.  If,  at  point  E,  the  return  on 
capital is insufficient,  firms will decumulate capital over  time and  the  CC 
locus  will  shift  to  the  left,  leading  - at  the  same  real  wage  - to 
increasing unemployment.  Or  take  the  case  of  a  demand  contraction  from  E 
to  B:  by  decreasing profits, it may  lead  to capital decumulation and  shift 
the  CC  locus  to  the  left,  preventing  a  return to full employment  without  a 
cut  in wages. 
These  two  cases  are  particularly relevant  in  the  current  European 
context.  What  is  required  for  steady  employment  growth  is  the  right 
combination  of  factor  prices,  real wages  and  capital  costs,  together  with 
the  right  level  of  aggregate  demand  to  sustain  supply.  Let  us  consider 
labour costs,  the capital constraint and  demand  in turn. -9-
Fig.  1 
N 
Real wage 
c 
c 
Aggregate demand 
N 
111.1.  Real  Wages 
Wage  gap measures 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  two  oil  shocks,  much  attention was  devoted  to 
wage  gaps,  which  simply  measure  changes  in  labour  shares  from  some 
bench-mark  or  initial  level.  Positive  wage  gaps,  the  argument  went, 
indicated that real wages  were  too high,  negative wage  gaps  that wages  were 
too  low.  Such  attempts  to  learn  something  from  the  movement  of  labour 
shares alone have  now  been discredited,  for at least  two  reasons. -10-
The  question  of  whether  real  wages  are  too  high  or  too  low is not 
well  defined.  After  a  period  of  capital  decumulation  for  example,  real 
wages  may  be  too  high  to  achieve  full  employment  at  the  existing  c~pital 
stock,  but may  still be  low enough  to sustain capital accumulation and  full 
employment  in the medium  or  long run. 
The  other and  more  important  reason is that  labor shares are  simply 
not  good  indicators  of  a  wage  problem.  They  may  increase  (after  an 
increase in the  price of  non-labour  inputs  for  example)  without  reflecting 
a  wage  problem.  Conversely,  an  increase  in  real  wages  may  induce 
substitution  of  capital  for  labor  and  lead  to  a  wage-induced  labour 
productivity  increase,  leaving  the  labour  share  unchanged  and  hiding  a 
serious real wage  problem. 
Production function estimates 
The  approach  that  is  now  used  relies  on  estimation  of  production 
functions2  to  disentangle  the  sources  of  employment  changes.  Two  recent 
studies  have  followed  this  direction  and  explored  the  determinants  of 
output  and  employment  changes  in  various  OECD  countries.  The  findings  of 
one  study3,  which  focuses  on  Japan  and  the  UK,  are  summarized  in  table  7. 
They  suggest  an  important  role  of  real  wages  in  the  rapid  decline 
of  UK  manufacturing  since  1973:  had  real  wages  remained  constant,  annual 
growth of  labour demand  in manufacturing would  have  been  2.3%  higher. -II-
Table  7 
Sources  of Manufacturing  Labour  Demand  Growth 
(average  annual % rate of  change) 
1963-1972  1973-1982 
UK  Japan  UK  Japan 
Total growth  -1,5  1,6  -3,9  -0,3 
Due  to: 
Wages  -1,4  -5,6  -2,3  1,3 
Capital  4,2  12,9  2,0  6,3 
Material prices  0,2  -0,3  -1,3  2,2 
Labour  saving 
technical progress  -3,9  -5,6  -1,7  -5,6 
Cyclical  0,1  0,3  -0,5  -0,2 
Residual  -0,7  -o,o  -0,2  -0,4 
Source:  L.  Lipschitz  and  S.  Schadler,  "Relative  prices,  real  wages  and 
macroeconomic  policies",  IMF  Staff Papers,  June  1984. 
A  study  by  Artus4  also  uses  a  production  function  approach  to 
investigate  the  role  of manufacturing  real wages  in influencing  employment 
in major industrialised countries.  Its finding is that  for  the  UK,  France, 
Germany  (and  Japan!)  - unlike  the  US  and  Canada  - excessive growth in real 
wages  is responsible  for  the  increase  in unemployment  (taking  as  given  the 
path  of  the  capital  stock) •  For  Germany,  France  and  the  UK,  the  gap 
between  actual real  wages  and  warranted  wages  (that  is,  wages  which  would 
be  consistent with full  employment  given  the  current  capttal stock)  ranges 
between  12  and  16%  (See  Table 8). 
Table  8 
Actual and  warranted real wage  growth 
(average annual % rate of change) 
1973-1978 
1979-1982 
Germany 
A  w 
5,7  3,8 
1,9  1,5 
United Kingdom 
A  w 
3,5  3,6 
2,8  -0,1 
_  ___.. _____________  - -----~-------- ..  :w 
Note:  A = actual, W =  warranted. 
France 
A  w 
5,7  4,7 
2,5  1,8 
S"'Ur'ce  :  J.  Artus,  "The  disequilibrium  real  wage  hypothc~s ts:  an  empirical 
evaluation",  IMF  Staff Papers,  June  1984. -12-
How  seriously  should  these  quantitative  estimates  be  taken?  One 
must  use  them  with some  caution,  for at least three reasons. 
The  first  is  that,  even  on  its  own  terms,  estimation  of  production  or 
demand  functions  is  fraught  with  difficulties.  Measurement  of  the 
capital  stock  in  periods  of  rapid  changes  in  factor  prices,  or  in 
periods  of  changes  in  demand  patterns  or  in  periods  of  high  rates  of 
bankruptcy is extremely difficult.  What  is the contribution of shipyard 
capital to production?  Another  problem  is that  of  cyclical adjustment, 
which  ts  usually  introduced  at  the  estimation  stage  rather  than 
incorporated in the  theory and  plays a  major role in the estimation. 
The  second  is  that,  even  given  capital  and  other  factor  prices,  the 
relation  between  real  wages  and  employment  also  depends  on 
competitiveness,  a  factor  which  is  not  incorporated  in  the  production 
function approach. 
The  third reason is that real wages  (or direct labour costs)  are not  the 
only labour  costs.  Turnover  costs,  or  adjustment  costs  in general,  and 
inflexibility of  the wage  structure may  also affect  employment. 
We  now  consider  these issues in some  detail. 
Real wages  and  import  competition 
Most  of  the  discussion  about  real  wages  takes  place  implicitly 
under  the  assumption  of  perfect  competition.  Firms  can  sell  as  much  as 
they want  at  the  prevailing price;  but  in fact  European  firms  are having a 
very  tough  time  hustling  demand  at  the  going  price.  They  view  increasing 
import  penetration as  a  very serious  issue,  and  indeed it is. 
To  think about  the  issue  of  import  competition,  one  must  relax the 
assumption of  perfect  cotnpetition in product  markets.  We  can  think of  the 
problem most  easily in terms  of monopolistic competition,  where  each firm's 
demand  depends  on  aggregate  demand  and  the  firm's  price  relative  to  the 3) 
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industry  average.  Import  competition  here  simply  takes  the  form  of  a 
reduction  in  the  industry-wide  price  because  the  import  segment  of  the 
industry  price  falls.  All  do1J1e,:;ti.e  f lr-11ts  ·face  an  inward  shift  of  their 
demand  curve.  They  react by contracting output  and  employment. 
Conversely,  if  the  home  country  gains  in  international 
competitiveness,  perhaps  because  of  exchange  depreciation  at  constant 
wages,  there  is  an  expansion  in  output  and  employment  at  the  expense  of 
foreign competitors  (see appendix 1).  In both cases,  the real wage,  defined 
as  the  ratio  of  the  nominal  wage  to  the  output  price  may  not  change;  the 
production function would  simply not detect the wage  problem. 
In  the  period  1980  to 1985,  there have  been offsetting effects from 
the  large  dollar  appreciation  that  promoted  competitiveness  and  from  the 
increasing  gain  in  cost  competitiveness  on  the  part  of  the  NIC 's.  The 
balance  is  unclear,  but  as  we  note  below,  if the  dollar  comes  down,  and 
competition  from  the  NIC  is  the  only effect  left,  then there might well  be 
a  serious real wage  problem. 
Hiring and  firing costs and  employment 
The  production  function  approach,  or  more  generally  the  focus  on 
direct  labor  costs,  neglects  altogether  the  labour  costs  that  arise  in 
connection  with  movements  in  employment.  These  include  hiri~g  costs  as 
well as  firing costs,  severance  pa~uents or tenure restrictions.  If hiring 
workers  includes  a  large  fixed  cost,  firms  will  be  much  more  reluctant  to 
hire  if  other  possibilities  are  open  to  them.  If  dismissing  workers  is 
costly,  firms will  take  this  into account  at hiring  time.  These  costs will 
have a  substantial effect  on  the level of employment. 
An  important  point  here  is  that,  for  a  given  set  of  severance 
rules,  severance  costs will  be  higher,  the  lower is  the  rate of  growth  or 
the  more  variable  is  demand.  In  an  economy  where  demand  is  growing  in  a 
stable fashion,  severance  pay or severance restrictions present little risk 
for  firms.  Most  firms  survive  and  in most  years  expect  to  have  positive 
gross  hires.  If a  mistake  is made,  it takes  the form  of hiring a  worker  a - 14-
few  months  too  early.  Firms  (or  the  government)  can  be  generous  with 
severance pay  because  most  of  the  time it does  not  have  to be  paid. 
Suppose  now  that  growing  demand  turns  flat  or  that  stable  demand 
turns volatile.  Extended recession periods become  a  real possibility.  The 
given  severance  pay  and  rules  now  become  an  important  obstacle  to 
employment  creation.  Firms  respond  to  a  pick  up  in  demand  by  relying  on 
overtime,  not  by increasing employment. 
There  is an interesting conundrum  here  with  important  implications 
for  policy.  With  low  growth,  severance  costs  and  teoure  art'ange,nents 
represent  substantial  costs  to  firms;  but  once  these  costs  are  there, 
employment  growth  may  in  turn  be  harder  to  restore  and  relinquishing  the 
rules becomes  more  difficult. 
What  evidence  do  we  have  about  the  sr.7.e  of  this  effect?  Not  much, 
as  not  much  work  has  been  devoted  to  this  issue.  One  can  gather  direct 
evidence  on  growth and  variability of demand.  That  growth has  decreased is 
obvious.  What  about  variability of  demand?  Table  9  gives  some  evidence 
using  OECD  data. 
Table  9 
Changes  in sectoral employment  shares 
-----... -..........  - ..---... 
France  Germany  Netherlands  United 
Kingdom 
... ---- ___ ..._. ... --·---
1957-61  6,16  7,79  4,04  3,23 
1961-65  7,29  7,24  6,03  5,04 
1965-69  7,04  5,76  7,80  5,28 
1969-73  8,12  8,42  7,74  6,91 
1973-77  8,14  7,87  8,19  6,54 
1977-81  6,52  4,73  6,13 
Notes  The  figures  in the  table are calculated  as~leit- eit-~' 
where  eit  is  the  % share  of  sector  i  in  total  employment  at  time  t  and 
there  are  eight  sectors  in  each  cou11try  (agriculture,  mining, 
manufacturing,  utilities,  construction,  distributive  trades  and  catering, 
transport and  communication,  services). 
Source  :  OECD  labour force statistics, various years,  chained. -15-
At  that  level  of  aggregation  and  with  this  crude  measure,  demand 
appears  less,  not  more,  volatile  than  in  the  1960's.  It is  possible  that 
more  disaggregated  measures  would  show  more  volatility  in  the  recent 
period.  More  importantly,  changes  in  sectoral  employment  shares  may  be 
poor  proxies  for what  we  are trying to capture,  Small  changes might  result 
not  from  smaller  variability  of  demand  but  from  the  very  ossification  of 
labour markets we  discussed above. 
One  can  also  examine  the  dynamic  output-employment  relation  for 
evidence  of  the  strength  of  tieverance-tenure  arrangements.  One  would 
expect  these  arrangements  to  lead  to  a  small  and  slow  response  of 
employment  in Europe  to  output  changes.  Here  again  the  empirical evidence 
is only  mixed  at  best.  Employment  responds  to  demand  and  the  lag  is  not 
very  substantial.  Moreover,  the  US  and  German  employment-output  linkages 
are  almost  identical.  However,  the  employment  response  to  output  is much 
smaller  in  France  and  the  UK  than in  the  US.  Table  10  shows  the  evidence 
on this point. 
-•  ,--.. ------------ ~  ,--~. ------------------
Table  10 
Effect of output growth  on  employment  growth 
Elasticity 
Mean  lag (quarters) 
United 
States 
0,83 
1,9 
France 
0,33 
2,2 
Germany 
0,76 
2,2 
United 
Kingdom 
0,54 
3,4 
Note:  These  estimates are obtained  from  regressions of employment  growth on 
output  growth  using  a  third-order  unconstrained  Almon  lag  and  first  order 
serial correlation correction.  The  sample  period  is  1970:1  - 1983:4.  The 
elasticity reported in the table is the sum  of  the coefficients on  output. 
Wage  dispersion and  wage  flexibility 
A  common  argument  in  the  European  employment  diseussion  concerns 
wage  dispersion, wage  flexibility,  and  work  rules  in general.  The  European 
wage  structure,  it is said,  is  both  less  responsive  to  supply  and  demand - 16-
changes  and  much  narrower  than  its  US  counterpart.  Outdated  work  rules 
impair productivity and  profitability.  The  result, it is argued,  is higher 
unemployment. 
There  is  no  question  that  silly  rules  impair  employment: 
prohibiting Sunday  work,  or requiring statutory surcharges  for night hours, 
etc.  simply close-off  jobs  that might  otherwise  appear.  There  is no  doubt 
that here  the difference with the  US  is spectacular. 
Wage  dispersion 
What  about  wage  dispersion  and  wage  flexibility?  We  start  with 
wage  dispersion.  Table  11  shows  comparative data on wage  dispersion in the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Germany  for  a  sample  of  nine 
industries  in  1975  and  1982  and  reports  coefficients  of  variation.  The 
facts  are clear:  although  the  increase  in dispersion  from  1975  to 1982  has 
apparently  been  twice  as  large  in  Germany  as  in  the  United  States,  the 
United  States  has  still  greater  dispersion  than  either  Germany  or  the. 
United  Kingdom. 
Table  11 
Wage  dispersion:  1975  and  1982 
United  States  United Kingdom  Germany 
1975  1982  1975  1982  1975  1982 
Mean  6,35  11,63  3,26  6,80  6,19  10,44 
Standard 
deviations  2,32  5,48  0,61  1,85  1,19  3,06 
Coefficients 
of variation  0,37  0,47  0,21  0,27  0,19  0,29 
Note:  All  numbers  are  in  dollars.  The  means,  standard  deviations,  and 
coefficients  of  variation are  computed  using  a  sample  of  nine  industries: 
apparel,  textiles,  iron  and  steel,  motor  vehicles,  chemicals,  leather, 
paper, electrical equipment,  and  electrical machinery. 
Source:  US  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  unpublished data. -17-
This  picture is  confirmed  by  studies  of  wage  dispersion at  a  more 
disaggregated  levelS:  wage  dispersion is lower in Europe  than in the  US. 
But  what  is the relation of  wage  dispersion to employment?  This is 
far  from  being  an  easy  question  to  answer.  Lower  wage  dispersion  could 
simply  be  the  result  of  market  forces  and  reflect  a  different  technology 
and  skill distribution in Europe.  This  is,  however,  quite  unlikely;  there 
is little reason  to  expect  Europe  and  the  US  to  differ  so  drastically  in 
this  respect.  Furthermore,  once  government  regulation,  union wage-setting 
and  tradition have  taken  their toll,  there is no  longer  a  presumption  that 
wage  differentials  reflect  productivity  differentials.  Employment  and 
technology  will  adjust  to  the  wage  structure  rather  than  the  converse. 
What  does  this imply? 
A  compression  of  wage  differentials,  say  by  the  imposition  of  a 
minimum  wage,  will simply cut out  low-wage  industries,  substituting imports 
for domestic  employment  or abolishing  the goods  altogether (i.e. shoeshines 
and  home-delivered  rolls).  The  same  is  true  when  regional  wage 
differentials  are  not  allowed:  labour  in  disadvantaged  areas  will  be 
unemployed  rather  than employed at  lower  wages. 
One  must,  however,  bear in mind  that there are  two  ends  to the wage 
distribution:  low  wage-dispersion,  for  a  given  mean  wage,  implies 
relatively low wages  at the top.  High-wage  industries get  cheap  labour and 
low~age industries go  out  of business.  The  net effect in the short  run is 
adverse.  But  in the  long  run,  capacity  can  expand  and  create more  jobs  in 
the high-wage  industries.  The  ultimate effect on  ernployment  may  be  small. 
Wage  flexibility 
What  about  short-run  wage  flexibility,  i.e.  the  response  of  wages 
to shifts in supply and  demand?  The  standard approach has  been  to estimate 
relations in the  form: -l8-
where  Wi/W  refers to the growth of wages  in a  particular region or sector 
relative to aggregate wage  growth and  (Ui/U)  refers to unemployment  (or 
vacancies)  in  that  region  or  sector  relative  to  the  aggregate.  The 
coefficient  b  can  then  be  thought  of  as  a  measure  of  wage  flexibility. 
Estimates  of b  for  the  UK  are very low,  suggesting little wage  flexibility; 
we  are not  aware,  however,  of systematic inter-country comparisons6. 
Again,  suppose that wage  flexibility is  low in  E~rope. 
flexibility  related  to  employment?  The  relation  here 
How is wage 
is  more 
straightforward.  The  less wage  flexibility,  the harder it is  for  expanding 
sectors to recruit  new  labour  and  the harder it is for declining sectors  to 
remain  competitive.  Given  the  constant  need  for  labour  reallocation,  the 
less  wage  flexibility  there  is,  the  higher  is  the  equilibrium  level  of 
unemployment  and  the  lower  is  the  level  of  employment.  This  is  hard  to 
quantify but is surely present in Europe. 
III.2.  The  capital constraint 
In  considering  the  capital  constraint,  we  start  by  reviewing  the 
conceptual  issues  associated  with  the  role  of  capital  in  the  current 
employment  situation. 
Does  it make  sense  to  think  of  a  separate capital constraint?  As 
we  have  seen,  at a  point  in  time  it surely does.  If  the  capital  stock is 
low,  for  whatever  reason,  fewer  workers  can  be  employed  at  any  given real 
wage.  In  Figure  1  (page  9),  the  lower  the  capital  stock,  the  lower  the 
level  of  employment  at  a  given  real  wage.  If  in  the  short  run  there  is 
little substitution between  capital and  labour  and  if the  capital stock is 
low,  the  economy  may  be  more  accurately  described  by  Figure  2.  In  that 
case  there is simply no  real wage  at which  the economy  can in the short run 
achieve  full  employment.  In  a  real sense,  the  constraint  on  employment  is 
in this case first and  foremost  a  capital constraint. -19-
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But  capital  is  not  a  given,  unaffected  by  economic  events.  In  a 
longer  time  perspective it is endogenous,  being  determined  by  the  state of 
demand  and  factor  prices.  In  that  perspecttve,  low capital may  come  from 
an increase in the  cost  of  capital at given real wages.  This  increase may 
come  from  increases in real interest rates or  changes  in the tax treatment. 
If real wages  remain at their initial level, this increase in cost  leads  to 
decumulation  of  capital  in  parallel with  a  steady decrease  in  employment. 
The  process  stops when  the  economy  has  run  itself into  extinction  or  when 
real wages  finally decrease  to offset the higher cost  of capital. 
Low  capital may,  on  the  other hand,  come  from  an  increase in wages 
or  in  general  labour  costs  in  the  face  of  a  constant  required  rate  of 
return on capital.  In this case,  the  increase  in labour costs  leads  firms 
to  emigrate  or  to  try  to  save  on  labour  and  shift  to  a  more 
capital-intensive  technology.  But  it  also  squeezes  profits,  leading  on 
balance  to  less  investment  and  to capital decumulation.  Capital deepening 
together  with  an  overall  decrease  in  capital  accumulation  combine  in  turn 
to  lead  to  a  steady decrease  in employment.  Again,  the  process stops only 
when  either  real  wages  gi\fe  or  ·117her1  the  required  return  on  capital 
decreases. -20-
The  capital constraint in this case is a  dynamic  implication of the 
labour  cost  problem.  However,  as  time  passes,  the  capital  decumulation 
leads  to  a  true  capital  constraint  and  makes  the  labour  cost  problem 
steadily more  severe.  When  capital  has  decumulated,  the  decrease  in real 
wages  necessary  to  achieve  full  employment  quickly  is  much  larger  than at 
the  beginning of the process. 
Finally,  low capital accumulation can  come  from  low demand  at given 
factor  prices.  This  is  the  well  known  and  empirically  very  strong 
accelerator relation between demand  and  investment. 
With  these  preliminary  remarks  in mind,  what  can  we  say  about  the 
role  of  capital in  the  European  unemployment  problem?  Table  12  gives  the 
hasic investment  numbers  since  1970. 
Table  12 
The  investment  performance 
Investment  as  Rate  of change,  %  % of  GDP 
EC  us  EC  us 
1971-80  21,3  18,5  1,5  2,4 
1980  20,8  15,6  1,6  -6,1 
1981  19,9  15,5  -4,5  1,5 
1982  18,9  14,3  -1,7  6,8 
1983  18,5  14,6  -0,1  8,4 
1984  18,7  15,8  3,2  13,2 
Sources:  Commission  of  the  EC,  Annual  Economic  ReEort 1  1984/85  Statistical 
Annex  Table  14,  and  Data Resources  inc. 
There  is  again  a  sharp  contrast  between  the  1970s  and  the  1980s, 
and  between the  US  and  Europe.  The  rate of  growth  of  investment  in Europe 
in  the  1970s  was  small,  but  higher  than  the  rate  of  eroployment.  This 
suggests  - and  estimated  production  functions  seem  to  confirm  this  view  -
that  the  1970s  were  a  period  of  low  capital  accumulation  and  of  capital -21-
deepening.  The  strong  productivity  growth  performance  of  Europe  in  the 
1970s  was  at least partly a  reflection of  the labour cost  problem. 
What  about  the  1980s?  The  dismal  performance  of  investment, 
especially  compared  to  that  of  the  US,  may  either  be  bad  news  or  mixed 
news.  It  is  bad  news  if it  simply  reflects  capital  decumulation:  firms 
faced  with  low  aggregate  demand  since  1980  (more  on  this  in  Sec.  111.3.) 
and  high  real  interest  rates  and  labour  costs  have  responded  by  cutting 
investment  spending.  It  is  mixed  news  if  it  reflects  not  only  capital 
decumulation  but  also  the  choice  by  firms  of  less  capital-intensive 
technologies,  a  partial undoing of the earlier period of capital deepening. 
That  is,  firms  think  that  labour  market  improvements  are  here  to  stay, 
believe  that  the  cost  of  labour  will  be  lower  in  the  future  than  in  the 
past,  and  are  returning  to  more  labour-intensive  techno  log tes.  In  this 
latter case  prospects for  employment  ar less grim than in the  former. 
How  can  we  tell?  This  is not  easy  to  do  without  looking at a  more 
disaggregated picture  of  investment  in the last five  years.  However,  some 
hint  is  given  by  the  recent  behaviour  of  capacity  utilization.  If  low 
investment  reflects  the  net  disappearance  of  capital,  one  would  expect 
capacity utilization numbers  to be  high despite  the  lack of  output  growth. 
If  low  investment  reflects  instead  a  shift  towards  more  labou~intensive 
machinery,  the  firms  should  be  in  a  position  to  satisfy  an  increase  in 
demand.  Recent  capacity utilization numbers  give  credence  to  the  bad  news 
hypothesis:  while  GDP  growth in Germany  over  1983-84 was  3,4%,  the increase 
in capacity utilization  (in manufacturing)  over  the  same  period  was  5,7%. 
Capacity utilization rates are now  high in many  EC  countries!7 
Overall,  the  evidence  suggests  that  although  capital has  not  been 
the  limiting  factor,  the  decline  in  investment  over  the  last  five  years 
implies that,  were  aggregate  demand  to be  increased,  capital shortage mlght 
turn out  to be  a  relevant  constraint on  expansion of outputs. -22-
III.3.  Deficient demand 
One  remarkable feature of the  recent unemployment  experience is the 
sharp  increase  in unemployment  in the early 1980s  in all the  EC  countries. 
One  would  not  expect  supply factors  (except  for  clearly identifiable major 
changes,  such  as  a  doubling  of  the  price  of  oil)  to  lead  to  such  a  rapid 
and  generaliz~d increase  in  unemployment  in  so  short  a  time.  Rather  one 
would  expect  these  factors  to  increase  slowly  the  sustainable  rate  of 
unemployment,  perhaps  by  increasing  the  rate  of  inflation at  a  given  rate 
of  unemployment  and  forcing  governments  to accept  more  unemployment,  or  to 
lead  slowly  to  a  deterioration  of  the  trade  balance  over  time,  leading 
governments  to force  a  decrease in the  product wage. 
It  is  our  opinion  that  a  sharp  decrease  in  aggregate  demand  is 
indeed  the  proximate  cause  of  the  rise  in  unemployment  in  the  EC  since 
1980.  The  use of monetary policy to fight  inflation and  the major shift in 
fiscal policy towards  "budgetary consolidation",  however  justified,  seem  to 
explain much  of  the  poor  growth  performance  of  the  1980s9.  Consider  the 
figures  given  in  Table  13  concerning  fiscal  policy.  They  show  cyclically 
adjusted,  inflation-adjusted  deficits  for  the  larger  EC  countries  as  well 
as  for  the  US 10. 
Table  13 
Fiscal balances:  % GDP 
1979 
1984 
(mid-cycle,  inflation-adjusted, general government) 
minus  sign •  deficit 
us 
1,3 
-1,3 
D 
-3,3 
0,8 
UK 
0,6 
1,7 
F 
-1,0 
-0,2 
I 
-1,2 
-1,9 
Sources:  OECD,  "Structural  budget  deficits  and  fiscal  stance",  Working 
Paper 15,  July 1984,  and  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  July 1984. -23-
It is clear that  there has  been  a  dramatic  change  in fiscal policy 
in  Europe  during  the  period.  Structural  deficits  have  been  reduced  in 
almost  all  EC  countries.  For  the  EC  as  a  whole,  cyclically  and 
inflation-adjusted deficits were  reduced by close to  2%  of  GDP  from  1981  to 
198411. 
It  is  difficult  to  determine  the  respective  roles  of  fiscal 
consolidation  and  monetary  stabilization  in  the  contraction  of  aggregate 
demand  in  the  last  four  years.  The  theory  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy 
under  flexible  exchange  rates  suggests  that  much  of  the  change  in  the 
fiscal  stance  gets  dissipated  in  exchange  rate  movements.  However,  the 
strength  of  the  fiscal-led  US  recovery  is  proof  that fiscal policy can  be 
very effective in  the  country  in which  it originates,  even  under  flexible 
rates. 
The  argument  must  be  symmetrical  and  apply  to  the  European 
contraction, with  one  important  qualification.  Fiscal expansion in  the  US 
has  largely  taken  place  through  tax  reductions  on  both  households  and 
firms.  Fiscal  stabilization  in  Europe  has  largely  taken  place  through 
reductions  in  transfer  programmes  and  government  constttnption.  In  that 
sense, despite their opposite effects on  the budget,  both fiscal programmes 
may  have  improved  incentives. 
This  being  said,  two  important  caveats  must  be  made  which  will 
relate  this  conclusion  to  the  discussion  of  the  role  of  supply  factors. 
The  first  is  that,  even  if aggregate  demand  is  the  proximate  cause  of  the 
sharp  increase  in  unemployment,  it  is  quite  possible  that,  behind  the 
scenes,  the  sustainable  level  of  unemployment  has  smoothly  but  steadily 
increased during the  same  period. 
The  second 
necessarily  undo. 
demand  to  create 
caveat  is  that  what  demand  does,  demand  cannot 
For  example,  it  is  possible  for  a  sharp  decrease  in 
Keynesian  unemployment,  but  to  lead  to  classical 
unemployment  over  time  through its adverse effect on  investment  and  capital 
accumulation.  In  this  case,  although  an  increase  in  demand  early  in  the 
process would  sustain an  increase in output,  the same  increase later may  be -24-
of  little  use,  as  the  capital  stock  is  no  longer  there  to  allow  for  an 
increase  in  production.  We  have  seen  that  the  investment  performance  of 
the  EC  has  been  poor  for  the  last  four  years.  Whether  this  tells us  that 
Keynesian unemployment  is slowly becoming  classical depends  on whether this 
low  level  of  investment  reflects  reverse  capital  widening  or  reverse 
capital deepening,  an issue we  have already discussed. 
Quantifying  the  contributions  of  supply  and  demand  factors  in  the 
determination  of  unemployment  is  obviously  very  difficult.  As  the 
sustainable  rate  of  unemployment  is also  the non-accelerating  inflationary 
rate  of  unemployment  (the  NAIRU),  there  would  appear  to  be  a  way  of 
estimating this  rate  and  its evolution  through  time  just  by  estimating the 
unemployment  rate at  which  inflation  does  not  accelerate.  But  this  turns 
out  not  to  y1eld  very  precise  estimatesl2.  Empirical  results  suggest  an 
increase in the sustainable rate,  but give little indication as  to the size 
of the increase. 
What  is  needed  therefore  is  an  estimation  of  a  structural  model. 
Layard  and  Nickelll3 have  recently attempted  such a  task for  the  UK.  Their 
model  does  not  include  all  of  the  factors  we  have  considered  in  this 
section  (e.g.  it  does  not  include  measures  of  wage  dispersion  or  of  the 
decrease in employment  flexibility),  and  their way  of measuring  some  of the 
factors  they include,  such as  the mismatch  index or the effects of unions, 
is  certainly  subject  to  discussion  and  disagreement.  Nevertheless  their 
results  shed  light  on  the  issue.  They  are  summarized  in  Table  14,  which 
gives  the average unemployment  rate as well as their estimated natural rate 
for  the various  periods. -25-
Table  14 
Actual  and  "natural••  unemployment  rates in the  UK 
1967-74  1975-79  1980-83 
Actual rate  3,8  6,8  13,8 
"natural" rate  4,1  7,8  10,7 
Source  :  R.  Layard  and  s.  Nickell,  "The  Causes  of British Unemployment", 
National Institute Economic  Review 1/85,  N°  111,  February  1985,  Table  7. 
The  table suggests  two  conclusions.  The  first is that of a 
substantial  6,6%  increase in the sustainable rate of unemployment  since the 
beginning of the  1970s.  The  second is of a  large increase in the actual 
rate over this sustainable rate since  1980. 
IV.  THE  MEDIUM-TERM  OUTLOOK 
Things  have  been grim for  the last five years.  ·Is  there light at 
the  end  of the  tunnel?  Table  15  gives  the forecasts  of the  EC  Commission: 
Table  15 
Forecasts for  1985 
GDP*  volume 
Employment* 
Population of working  age* 
Unemployment  rate 
Real  unit labour cost* 
Inflation rate (private consumption) 
Cyclically and  inflation 
adjusted budget  balance  (as  % of GNP) 
* growth  rate 
1984 
2,2 
0,0 
0,9 
11,0 
-0,9 
5,1 
-2,0 
1985 
2,3 
o,o 
0,5 
11,5 
-1,2 
4,2 
-1,6 
Source  :  Commission  of the  EC,  Annual  Economic  Report,  1984/1985. -26-
These forecasts  do  not  suggest  dramatic changes  in the near future. 
Positive  growth  is  forecast,  but  at  a  rate  so  low  that  employment  is  not 
expected  to  increase.  As  a  result,  unemployment  is  expected  to  increase 
further,  to 11,5%. 
The  good  news  is  thin.  Inflation will  decrease  by  another  0, 9%. 
Investment  intentions  are  stronger  than  in  the  recent  past,  leading  the 
Commission  to  forecast  a  growth  of  3,6%  in  investment  for  1985.  Real unit 
labour  costs  will  decrease,  by  another  1,2%,  bringing ·the  total  decease 
since  1981  to  3,8%.  This  is indeed  good  news  if the  real wage  problem  is 
at the centre of the European  problem.  Although  this represents  a  shift in 
income  distribution,  it  still  represents  a  relatively  small  decrease  in 
labour  costs.  Are  there  signs  that  other  labour  costs,  direct  and 
indirect, are also decreasing? 
The  EC  report's  list  of  measures  imp temented  or  likely  to  be 
implemented  in  the  near  future  is  no  cause  for  optimism14.  Many  of  the 
changes  are  programmes  or  legal  modifications  which  will  make  low 
employment  more  tolerable  - s•tch  as  work  sharing,  early  retirement,  and 
youth  training  - but  do  not  go  to  the  core  of  the  unemployment  problem. 
Isolated  experiments,  such  as  the  lifting  of  legal  restrictions  on  the 
organization of  the  work  week,  or  the  length  of  initial  training  periods, 
are  taking  place;  but  at  this  stage  they  are  of  marginal  quantitative 
importance. 
The  forecasts  therefore  are  for  more  of  the  same.  Can  one 
reasonably  hope  for. pleas.~nt  surprises?  Can  one  hope  for  an  investment 
boom  of·  the  US  variety?  US  evidence  shows  the  strong  performance  of  US 
investment  to  be  due  for  the  most  part  to  the  strong  output  performance. 
Given  the  expected  stance  of  fiscal  policy,  one  should  not  expect  an 
investment  boom  in Europe.  The  uncertainties  seem,  if anything,  to  be  on 
the  down  side~ the main  one  being  the dollar. -27-
Although  we  do  not  expect  a  sudden  collapse  of  the  dollar, 
surprises, if they happen,  are more  likely to be in the direction of dollar 
depreciation.  That  is,  the  current  high  dollar  is  consistent  with 
expectations of a  further small appreciation with large probability,  and  of 
a  large  decline  or  collapse  with  a  small  probability.  A  dollar 
depreciation would  easily wipe  out  the  progress made  in Europe  on  the  real 
wage  front  in  the  last  few  years.  (We  have  discussed  this  earlier.  See 
Section III.l, Real wages  and  import  competition.) 
V.  THREE  INFERIOR  OPTIONS 
To  set  the  stage  for  our  own  proposal,  we  review  three  other 
options and  show why  they are inferior. 
V.l. Stay on  course and  hope  for  the best 
The  first  is  to  pursue  the  austerity  strategy.  As  we  have  seen, 
this  strategy  can  claim  some  victories:  fiscal  consolidation  has  been 
achieved  in  many  - but  not  in  all  - countries;  inflation  is  down  by  6% 
since  1980.  But  is  the  strategy winning  on  the  employment  front?  We  have 
seen  that  the  near  future  does  not  hold  much  promise.  But  is it just  a 
matter of  time  before  the strategy succeeds? 
We  do  not  believe  that  it  will.  The  question  posed  by  the 
austerity strategy is this:  as  slack leads  to a  deterioration in short-run 
profitability,  do  the  slack-induced  cuts  in  real  wages  more  than 
compensate?  If  so,  each  day  is  a  victory  on  the  way  to  prosperity.  If 
not~  each  day  is  another  clay  of  destruction  of  the  economy's  supply-side 
potential. 
The  answer,  we  believe,  has  been  given  by  the  performance  of  the 
last  few  years.  Despite  some  real  wage  cuts,  the  investment  performance 
has  been  dismal.  As  we  have  discussed, it probably does  not  have  much  to 
do  with  a  return  to  mo-re  labour-intensive  technologies,  but  is  more  a -28-
response  to  poor  profitability.  The  short-term  outlook  under  current 
policies is not  satisfactory;  we  see  no  reason why  the  mediu~term outlook 
would  be  any better. 
v.2. Further cuts in real wages 
Another  option is to go  for major cuts in real wages.  The  argument 
for  further  wage  cuts  is  a  powerful  one.  If  labour  costs  are  too  high, 
there  is  simply  no  way  to  restore  steady  full-employment  growth.  One  way 
of  reducing  labour  costs  is  obviously  to  reduce  real  wages.  In  all 
likelihood,  however,  the  only  way  to  get  major  wage  concessions  is  to 
intensify  the  austerity  measures.  Given  our  assessment  of  current 
austerity programmes,  our  appraisal  of  this strategy is not  positive.  Two 
further elements are relevant here. 
The  first  is  that  unemployment  as  a  method  of  wage  reductions  may 
not work  in the medium  run.  What  workers  give  up  under  pressure,  they may 
want  back,  at  least in part, if and  when  the economy  improves.  Even  if the 
gains  are  permanent,  unemployment  runs  into  diminishing  returns.  We  have 
seen  that  the  proportion of  long-term unemployed  in total unemployment  has 
steadily  increased.  Many  of  the  long-term  unemployed  have  effectively 
ceased  looking  for  work  and,  as  a  result,  may  be  inefficient  draftees  in 
the fight against high real wages  and  inflation. 
Some  empricial  evidence  can  be  adduced  on  that  point.  One  can 
regress  Phillips curve  type relations,  separating unemployment  between  less 
than 6  months  (U~ and  more  than  6  months  (U)t  Such  a  relation, estimated 
for  the  UK  and  D for  the period  1964-1982,  gives: 
UK:  w •  .64 p(-1) + .36 w(-1)  -3.1  U  + .3 u1 + .004 time  s 
(2.2)  (2.2)  (2.2)  (.5)  (2.0) 
D  w •  .36 p(-1) +  .64 w(-1) -1.7 U  - .2 u1 + .002  time  s 
(1.9)  (1.9)  (1. 6)  (.1)  (1.1) -29-
where  w  is  the  rate  of  growth  of  hourly manufacturing  wages  and  p  is  the 
rate  of  CPI  inflation  (t-statistics  are  in  parentheses).  These 
regressions  suggest  that  the  long-term  unemployed  have  played  no  decisive 
role in wage  negotiations. 
The  second  element is that, as we  have  argued,  real wages  (or, more 
generally,  direct  labour  costs)  are  not  the  only  obstacle  to  employment 
growth.  Rigidities  of all sorts are  probably as  important.  Austerity and 
high unemployment  may  wear  out  some  of  them,  but  they hardly seem  to be  the 
best tools for  the  job. 
V.3.  Demand  expansion 
The  opposite  strategy  to  consolidation  is  demand  expansion. 
Advocates  of  a  demand  expansion  have  argued  that  it would  increase  output 
and  productivity,  directly solving  the  unemployment  problem  and  indirectly 
solving  any  real  wage  problem  by  temporarily  boosting  productivity  growth 
above  real wage  growth. 
To  a  large extent  this  has  been  the  strategy followed  by  the  US  in 
the  1980s,  although  - and  this  is  important  - with  strong  supply-side 
support  in  the  form  of  deregulation  and  substantial  tax  subsidies  to 
investment.  There  is little doubt  that  the  place  is  booming  and  that  the 
US  malaise  has  all  but  disappeared.  But  this  expansion  has  not  come 
without  unpleasant  side-effects.  Overvaluation  of  the  dollar  is  creating 
serious  difficulties  in  trade-exposed  manufacturing  and  agriculture. 
Public  and  external  debt  are  rising,  implying  the  need  for  a  perhaps 
painful fiscal consolidation in the future. 
These  side-effects  may  still  be  worth  the  price  for  the  US.  But 
the  US  is not  Europe.  A straight,  across-the-board  demand  expansion would 
probably  be  much  less  successful  in  Europe.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it 
could  reduce  unemployment  somewhat;  but  the  previous  section  makes  clear 
that there would  be  serious risks involved. -30-
Such  a  strategy  relies  in effect  on  two  bets.  The  first  is  that 
demand  expansion  creates  enough  investment  and  capital  accumulation  to 
avoid  any  capital  constraint.  The  second  is  that  demand  expansion  will 
remove  the  rigidities  which  must  be  overcome  if full  employment  is  to  be 
achieved  again.  The  second  bet  is a  very  risky one  for  Europe.  There  is 
little reason  to  expect  many  of  the  rigidities to  disappear  by  themselves. 
Indeed,  demand  expansion  may  well  alleviate  the  perceived  need  for 
structural changes.  In that  case  improvements  would  be  temporary at best, 
doing little to restore sustained employment  growth  in the future. 
VI.  THE  T~-HANDED APPROACH 
Neither  supply  nor  demand  measures  will  by  themselves  create  and 
sustain  employment  growth.  This  simple  point  forms  the  basis  of  our 
approach:  structural changes  on  the  supply side  are  required  if employment 
growth  is  to  be  sustained,  but  a  boost  is  needed  to  start  the  process. 
This  boost  must  come  from  timely  supply measures,  sustained  and  validated 
by  demand.  As,  in any  event,  the  process  of  return  to  full  employment  is 
likely to  take  some  time,  some  emergency  measures  may  have  to  be  taken  to 
alleviate  and  distribute  the  burden  of  low  employment  more  fairly.  We 
develop each of  these points in turn. 
VI.l. The  need  for structural changes 
Steady  employment  growth  implies  the  removal  of  many  rigidities. 
How  much  flexibility  needs  to  be  reintroduced  and  in what  particular  form 
will depend  upon  circumstances.  The  direction however  is clear and  the key 
idea  should  be  in  addition  to  the  removal  of  the  most  blatant 
restrtctions  - to  increase  the  menu  of  options  available  to  firms  and 
workers.  We  shall take only a  few  examples. 
The  standard  employment  relation  in  Europe  is  now  one  in  which, 
after a  short  training period,  workers  are given substantial  job guarantees 
which  make  termination costly for  the  firm.  Firms  could  instead offer two 
types  of  contracts:  one  with  job guarantees  and  one  of  fixed  length  (such -31-
contracts  are  now  being  considered  in  Germany,  under  the  Flexi-Konzept). 
Presumably  workers  choosing  the  tenure  contracts  would  pay  for  the 
insurance  in  the  form  of  lower  wages.  A1 ternatively,  severance  payments 
could  be  decreased  or  the  initial  training  period  could  be  made  longer. 
The  latter possibility now  exists in Belgium. 
There  is  no  question  that many  such  changes,  if applied across  the 
board,  would  decrease  the  job security of  those  already holding  jobs.  The 
issue  arises  of  whether  changes  should  only  apply  to  new  contracts  and 
preserve existing rights,  in effect creating a  dual structure in the  labour 
market,  at least during a  transition period. 
We  believe  that  this  dual  structure  between  two  types  of  employed 
workers  is  much  less  objectionable  than  the · curt>e•lt  dnal  structure  which 
has  the  employed  on  one  side  and  the  unemployed  on  the  other.  We  also 
return to an argument  we  made  before:  if employment  growth is restored,  job 
security provisions  are  less essential for workers  than  they are today.  In 
the  end  it is  the  stronger  macro  performance  which  provides  the  security, 
not  regulations. 
Along  the same  lines, measures  which allow for  more  flexible hours, 
for  more  flexible  weeks,  and  which  remove  the  tax  penalties  or  the  legal 
restrictions  on  part-time  employment  or work-sharing  should also  be  passed 
by  governanent,  gi\Tltlg  more  options  to  firms  and  workers.  Here  again, many 
governments  have  started  doing  just  that;  all  that  is  needed  is  an 
intensification of this effort. 
Measures  which  allow for  more  wage  flexibility  and  more  potential 
wage  dispersion  are  also  essential.  The  tax  and  transfer  system  can  be 
used  to  achieve  some  of  this,  for  example  to  decrease  the  cost  of  low-
skilled labour.  Where  social insurance benefits have  become  more  citizens' 
rights than workers'  rights,  there might  be  an  argument  for  financing  them 
out of income  taxation.  As  income  taxation is more  progressive,  this would 
lead  to  a  reduction of  the  costs  of  low-skilled versus  high-skilled  labour 
to  firms,  although  the  usual  negative  incentive  effects  of  progressive 
taxation must  be  taken into account.  Clearly,  the same  can  be  accomplished -32-
by  decreasing  social  security  and  other  contributions  on  low  wages 
directly. 
Sectoral  and  regional  differences  must  be  recognized  in  national 
wage  agreements.  For  example,  trigger  schemes,  which  would  exempt  regions 
or  sectors  in  difficulty  from  minimum  wage  legislation  or  from  wages 
negotiated in national agreements,  should  be  considered. 
These  are  only  some  of  the  measures  which  should  be  considered. 
Rigidities exist in goods  markets  as well,  in  the  form  of  trade  protection 
(both  within  the  EC  and  with  respect  to  countries  outside  the  EC), 
obstacles  to  the  creation  of  new  firms,  and  in  financial  markets.  These 
rigidities should also be  removed. 
VI.2.  A supply boost 
All  of  the  above  measures  are  essential  for  long-term  employment 
growth.  But  they  will  only  make  a  gradual  contribution;  something  much 
more  immediate  is needed  to  change  the  course  of  events.  We  believe that, 
in  the  short  run,  Europe  should  be  given  a  supply  boost,  i.e.  a  set  of 
timely supply incentives which,  together with demand,  would  start improving 
employment  now  rather  than  in  five  years.  In  turn,  an  improvement  in 
employment  prospects  now  will  make  it easier  to  obt~in  the  social compact 
needed  to achieve  labour market  changes. 
To  accomplish  this  we  advocate  both  investment  incentives  and 
marginal  employment  subsidies.  Investment  incentives  are  essential  if  we 
are  to  avoid  a  situation  where  demand  expansion  runs  into  the  capital 
constraint.  The  incentives  could  take various  forms.  The  most  attractive 
is  a  large  investment  tax  credit  for  a  period  of  a  few  years,  as  it 
provides  an  incentive for  firms  to  shift  investment  forward  in  time15  and 
thus may  start the process  of  renewed  growth earlier16. 
Pending  more  fundamental  changes  in labour markets,  we  are also  in 
favour  of  substantial  marginal  employment  subsidies:  labour  taxes  on  net 
increases in employment  in existing fir.ns  and  on hiring by new  firms  should -33-
be  partially or fully waived.  This will further increase profitability and 
employment.  There  are  obvious  difficulties  in  implementing  such  subsidies 
- in deciding about when  and  how  to phase  them  olltl7,  in avoiding abuse and 
losses  in  tax  revenues  that  do  not  create  employment.  Given  what  is  at 
stake,  these  problems are worth confronting. 
Finally,  these measures  and  the  associated  expansion,  if it comes, 
must  not  lead  to  renewed  wage  growth  for  the  time  being.  As  we  have seen, 
real wages  are surely  too  high  to achieve  full  employment  today,  given  the 
low capital stock.  They  may  also  be  too  high  to sustain steady employment 
and capital growth,  but nobody  knows  by how  much;  there would  almost  surely 
be  a  wage  problem if the dollar went  down  sharply. 
We  believe  that  structural  changes  on  the  supply  side  are  more 
important  than wage  cuts at  this  stage,  that  they require  a  social compact 
which  may  not  be  feasible  if workers  are  asked  to  take  substantial  wage 
cuts.  A reasonable  goal  is  for  negotiated  real wages  to  remain constant. 
This  implies,  once  wage  drift is  taken  into account,  about  a  1  to  2%  rate 
of increase per year in real wages  and  little change  in unit  labour costs. 
VI.3.  Supply and  demand 
Supply  measures,  without  accommodating  demand  policies,  will  have 
little impact  on  employment  and  output,  at  least in  the  short  run.  As  we 
have  seen,  the  experience  of  the  1980s  in Europe  strongly confirms  that if 
firms  do  not  see  improved  sales  prospects,  they will not  increase  capacity 
in  response  only  to  an  improvement  in  factor  prices.  The  US  experience 
during  the  same  period  shows  on  the  other  hand  that  the  combination  of 
reductions  in  factor  prices  and  of  a  complementary  demand  expansion  leads 
to  very  large  increases  in  investment.  The  same  is  just  as  true  of 
employment.  Thus  it  is  essential  to  make  sure  that  demand  is  there  to 
sustain supply. -34-
Will  demand  be  there?  Investment  tax  credits  create  demand  for 
investment  goods.  Increased competitiveness will shift  some  demand  towards 
European  products,  but  the effect is likely to  be  slow.  These  two  effects 
are  clearly not  enough  to make  much  of  a  dent  in  the  unemployment  rate  in 
the near future. 
We  believe  that,  in the countries which have substantially achieved 
fiscal  consolidation,  tax  reductions  incurred  because  of  additional 
investment  and  employment  by  firms  should  not  be  compensated  by  increases 
in other  ta~es.  The  old  principle that public deficits should only finance 
imre~tment  so  that  they  can  be  repaid  later applies  here.  By  their  very 
nature  the  tax  shortfalls  will  only  be  incurred  if  supply  is  increased; 
they  should  be  considered  investments  in  the  future  tax  base.  Some 
countries might  even consider going further.  To  the extent  that  income  tax 
reductions  are  actually  being  considered  for  the  future,  as  in  Germany, 
a  good  case can  be  made  for  implementing  them  now. 
Monetary  policy must  also  play an  important  role.  With  increasing 
supply,  the  economy  can  accommodate  higher  demand  and  there  should  be  no 
hesitation in increasing nominal  money  growth  to go  along with real growth. 
The  extent  of demand  expansion as well as  the relative use of fiscal versus 
monetary policy must  of course be  adapted to each country.  Those  countries 
in  which  the  adjustment  has  been  small,  both  in  terms  of  fiscal 
consolidation  and  the  inflation  rate,  should  obviously  concentrate 
relatively more  on  consolidation and  supply-side  improvements,  while  being 
relatively more  moderate  in domestic  demand  management. 
We  are reluctant to quote target real growth rates.  But  we  want  to 
re-emphasize  the major  theme  of  the  1984  report  by  the  CEPS  Macroeconomic 
Group.  To  decrease  unemployment,  a  period  of  growth  in  excess  of  trend 
will be  needed.  If the supply side is there,  there  should  be  no  reluctance 
on  the  part  .of  governments  to  aim  for  higher  growth  rtites  for  the  near 
future. -35-
VI.4.  Emergency  measures 
Even  under  the  most  optimistic  scenarios,  the  next  few  years  will 
still  be  years  of  high  unemployment.  Emergency  measures  should  be 
considered to alleviate and  distribute more  evenly  the  unemployment  burden: 
job  programmes  for  the  long-term  unemployed  and  work-sharing.  They  will 
not  solve  structural  problems  and  only  marginally  contribute  to  steady 
•  employment  growth.  They  even go  against  the grain and  the  logic of  some  of 
the structural reforms.  They  should  nevertheless  be  considered  in view of 
the welfare effects of current  employment. 
A  temporary  job  programme  for  the  long-term unemployed  will not  in 
the  context of  the  suggested social compact  lead to real wage  and  inflation 
explosions.  We  have  shown  that  the  long-term unemployed  have little effect 
on  either  one.  Thus,  removing  theut  frorrt  tha  t}(le.nployrnent  pool  will  have 
little effect  also.  Measures  which  ensure  that  the  long-term  unemployed 
can  find  a  place  in  a  public  programme  should  be  considered.  After  many 
years  of  low  public  capital  accumulation  and  maintenance,  there  are  many 
projects for which  the skills of the  long-term unemployed  can  be  used. 
Similar  arguments  apply  to  work-sharing.  The  fallacy  underlying 
much  of  the  discussion  about  work-sharing  is  that  there  is  a  permanent 
shortage of  jobs  in Europe.  There  is no  basis  for  such a  proposition.  Yet 
for  the  next  few  years,  there  is  indeed  a  shortage  and,  as  a  consequence, 
great  inequity  between  those  who  have  a  job,  and  hence  a  career  and  the 
prospect  of fulfillment,  ancl  the  •l•le•nployed  who  are left out.  Not  having a 
job means  that over  time  their ability to screen themselves  into employment 
deteriorates.  After  three or  four  years  of  recession,  having  held at best 
temporary  jobs,  their  lifetime  career  opportunities  are  dramatically 
different  from  those  privileged  to  h~~e had  a  job.  Voluntary work-sharing 
is  a  possible  answer,  even  if  it  involves  extra  costs  and  hence  quite 
possibly  some  cuts  in  aggregate  employment.  But  it  must  be  clear  that 
work-sharing is second  best.  It is a  sensible strategy for  the transition, 
given  the  assurance  that  a  transition is taking  place.  It must  not  become 
a  palliative,  which  makes  reform  less  pressing  and  ultimately  leaves 
everybody worse  off. -36-
In summary,  we  believe Europe  should  tackle its employment  problem. 
What  is  now  needed  is  a  social  pact  in  which  supply-friendly  measures  go 
hand  in hand  with a  vigorous  recovery. -37-
Appendix 1  :  Monopolistic competition and 
labour demand  in the open  economy 
Consider  the  standard  monopolistic  competition  model  applied  to 
macroeconomics.  The  firm  faces  a  demand  Di  •  A(pi/p)-x  and  technology is 
represented by a  constant unit  labour requirement  Di  •  Ni.  The  firm 
therefore maximizes  profits: 
The  closed economy  wage-price relation therefore is: 
w/pi  •  (x-1)/x, 
where  x  is  the  elasticity  of  demand  faced  by  the  individual  firm  defined 
positive  and  larger  than  unity,  and  pi  is  the  price  charged  by  the  ith 
firm.  Labour  demand  of  the  typical firm is 
X 
Ni  = K(P/w)  • 
Here  K  depends  on  the  industry  level  of  demand.  The  industry  price  level 
is given by 
p  =  [~~Pi  1-x  +~Pj 1-~J  1~x 
where  m is the number  of  firms  ~nd the  indices  i  and  j  denote  domestic  and 
foreign  fir1ns. 
Now  for  domestic  firms  the  price is fixed  by  the  wage.  But  foreign  prices 
enter  the  aggregate  price  index  and  hence  employment  determination.  The 
industry real wage  therefore  becomes  a  function  of  the  relative  wage  in a 
common  currency and  the relative number  of  domestte  a•lcl  forel3•1  fir•ns. 
1 
1-x  1-x  P/w =  z(a+(1-a)(w*/w)  ) 
where  a  is the fraction  of  firms  that  are  domestic  in the  sense  that their 
wage  is  w.  The  term  z  is  a  constant.  A cut  in  foreign  prices,  holding 
constant real aggregate demand  K,  lowers  the industry average price,  P,  and 
hence  employment  in  each  firm.  The  1.m.p~ct  is  l~rger  the  higher  the 
elasticity  of  deHtancl  ~nd  the  larger  the  number  of  foreign  relative  to 
domestic firms.  In the limit, if the market  is primarily served by  foreign 
firms,  the employment  elasticity with respect to the relative wage  is equal 
to the demand  elasticity. 
The  model  of  course  also  serves  to  explain  why,  given  wages  in  national 
currencies,  exchange  rate  movements  cause  PPP  deviations.  The  relative 
price  of  domestic  and  foreign  output  is  simply  determined  by  the  relative 
wage  and  the exchange  rate.* 
*  See  R.  Dornbusch,  "Purschasing  Power  Parity",  unpublished  manuscript, 
MIT,  January 1985. 1. 
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